An econometric model is used to estimate the net relationship between changes in the fann-Ievel price of milk and changes in the retail prices of four major dairy products-fluid milk. butler, cheese, and ice cream_ Results indicate that the {ann-retail price transmission process in the dairy sector is asymmetric_ Retail dairy product prices adjust more rapidly and more fully to increases in .he fann price of milk than to decreases. The role in pricing asymmetry of retail demand versus farm supply shifts is tested via a Chow-type test. Asymmetry is tested using the Houck procedure for estimating nonreversible functions.
This article focuses on price transmission processes in the dairy subsector. Because of industryconcentration beyond the fann gate, it is commonly asserted that middlemen use market power to employ pricing strategies which result in complete and rapid passthrough of cost increases but slower and less complete transmission of cost savings. Hence, a common feature of recent studies of food sector price transmission is the testing for re{ail pricing asymmetry (Ward, Heien, Hall et al.) . These studies suggest that interstage price "stickiness" occurs for some but not all food commodities. Because of its obvious relevance for dairy policy and the paucity of empirical evidence on the topic specific to the dairy sector, the asymmetry hypothesis serves as a focal point of this analysis. In addition to positing reasons< for suspecting price transmission asymmetry in the dairy subsector, empirical evidence is provided based on the Houck procedure for estimating nonreversible {unc-Henry w. Kinnucan is an assistan! professor in the Department of Agricullural Economics and Rural Sociotogy. Auburn University: Olan O. Forker is a professor. Department of AgricullUral Ec0-nomics. Com<: II University.
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tions. The role of shifts in retail demand vis-avis farm supply as an alternative explanation for price transmission asymmetry is exploced via a Chow-type test for parameter stability. A major research objective was to determine the extent to which downward adjustments in the dairy price support level specified in 1983 and 1985 legislation result in lowered retail prices for four dairy products-fluid milk, butter, cheese, and ice cream.
A Price Transmission Model
Theocetical models have been useful in establishing basic economic for<:esgoverning the farm-r.etail price transmission prooess in longrun competitive equilibriumc(Gardner1975), in describing relevant dynamicfeatut'es of tbe transmission process (Wohlgenant, Heien, Popkin) , and in identifying nonconventional forces affecting price spreads {Brorsen et al.). Because this study provides empirical evidence on the nature of farm-retail price linkages useful for dairy policy analysis and shortinterval (monthly) data are used, the markup pricing model of Heien was deemed most appropriate to use. Assuming competitive conditions, fixed-proportions production technology, and constant returns to ' scale (CRTS) in the food-marketing system, a pricing rule of t<he following .genc-ral form is obtained: (I) Copyright 1987 American Agricultural Economics Association 286 May 1987 A mer. 1. Agr. Econ. where R is retail price, F is farm price, and Z is a price vector (assumed exogenous) of marketing inputs. Equation (I) is additive in input costs and. in contrast to the Gardner model (to be discussed later). the price coefficients (b., b 2 ) are considered exogenous because thev are assumed "set in place" by past prices (H~ien, p. 14).
ger and by Sims. These tests have been used in empirical studies of price transmission (Heien, Lamm and Westcott , Ward) . Lamm and Westcott indicate that for dairy products as a group, the direction of causality runs from farm to retail. For the two individual dairy products studied by Heien, ajoint causal relationship between wholesale and retail price was found for butter and a unidirectionaldownward relationship was. found for milk .
In applying the markup model to the present problem, the underlying assumptions (Leontief production technology, constant returns to scale (CRTS), and competitive markets) need to be assessed and estimation issues delineated. The assumption of a Leontief production technology for milk-processing and retailing sectors appears acceptable because the possibilities for substituting marketing inputs for milk in response to changing factor prices are limited, especially in the short-run situation considered here. The CRTS assumption is equivalent to assuming constant marginal costs which, in tum, implies that the volume of farm product moving through the system is not a relevant variable in the price transmission model. Because preliminary analysis showed no statistically significant relationship between retail price and volume of milk processed for any of the four dairy products considered, the CRTS assumption was considered acceptable. Least defensible may be the notion of competitive markets. The existence of large dairy cooperatives, milk handlers, distributors, and processors suggests a relatively concentrated marketing channel for milk and dairy products. However, competition may be sufficient in a contestable market senSe (Baumol, Panzer, and Willig) tnat pricetaking behavior is more prevalent than otherwise might be assumed (see, e.g., Gardner 1984) . In any case, competition or lack thereof has not prevented the application of the mal'kup model to other commodities. Thus. a maintained hypothesis is that potential violation of this ac ssumption does not seriously affect the results.
Causality, lags. and asymmetry are important -c1emenfS to consider when estimating or testing the markup model. Implicit in the model's development is the notion that retail prices change in response to changing wholesale or farm prices. In the terminology of -Granger. farm or wholesale prices are assumed to "cause" retail prices and not vice versa.
An approach to testing statistically for the direction of causality was developed by GranBecause these tests are controversial (Conway et a1.), tests of causality were not made in this study. Instead, a unidirectional-upward causal relationship between farm-Ievd input prices and retail prices is assumed. Some supporting evidence for this assumption is discussed below.
Response of retail prices to changes in wholesale or farm-level prices is generally not instantaneous but instead is distributed over time. Reasons for the delayed response include: (a) normal inertia in the food-marketing system associated with storing, transporting, and processing the farm product (Hall et al.) ; (b) costliness of repricing items at retail (Heien) ; (c) market imperfections such as diversity in market structure and differences in information transmission and assimilation at vertical exchange points (Ward); and (d) the nature of price reporting and collection methods (Hall et al.) . Evidence specific to the dairy sector suggests that six months or less are required for retail dairy product prices to adjust fully to changes in the farm price of milk (Lamm and Westcott) .
Asymmetry in farm-retail price transmission is hypothesized to exist because of .. (a) industry concentration at market levels beyond the farmgate as mentioned previously. (b) government intervention in the pricing of farm milk, or (c) differential impacts of shifts in retail demand versus farm supply (Gardner 1975) . Deferring discussion of item (c) to later. the policy connection is explained as follows. Retailers or wholesa-Iers face some uncertainty when attempting to base prices on changes in-cost. If changes in costs are viewed as temporary. the ne' ed to reprice the item later may be an incentive to not change present price. Government intervention that establishes a floor on farm prices for extended periods can in part reduce the uncertainty associated with interpreting cost changes. For example. middlemen may view increases in farm prices caused by higher price supports as permanent increases in cos·ts that may have been anticipated in advance . Under these cond itiQns. an increase in CQst likely is transmitted rapidly and cQmpletely thrQugh the marketing system. Because reductiQns in price SUPPQrt levels occur Qnly infrequently. middlemen may view these effects as largely transitQry. resulting in a slQwer and less cQmplete passthrough.
TO' accQmmQdate the abQve cQnsideratiQns regarding lags and asymmetry. an empirical cQunterpart to' equatiQn (I) Qf the fQllQwing fQrm was specified: m, where RD, and MD, are retail price and marketing CQst variables. respectively. expressed as deviatiQns frQm their respective initial values, TR is a trend term. FR, and FF, are variables denQting the rising and falling phases Qf farm milk prices and are cQmputed via the HQuck procedure; and E, is a randQm errQr term. Finite distributed lag structures in the farm price variables are hYPQthesized. FQIIQwing Heien, MD, was nQt specified in distributed lag fQrm under the assumption that middlemen such as retailers wish to' use a "smQQthed" value of input CQst as a basis fQr pricing. AlsO', the MD, variable tended to' change .gradually Qver time in a predic-table fashiQn. 1 The Trl.; coefficients in equatiQn (2) , An argument could be made in favor of including asymmetric terms for the marketing COSI variable as well. However. as a prac· ti.:al mailer this would not be a meaningful refinement because the marketing cost index exhibits no incidence of price decline throughout the cleven-r ea r period considered in this study_
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Data and Estimation Procedures EquatiQn (2) was estimated fQr fQur majQr dairy prQducts-fluid milk. cheese. butter. and ice cream. In 1980. these fQur dairy products accounted fQr 95% Qf the utilizatiQn Qf farm milk (USDA). MQnthly undeftated retail price. the undeftated farm price Qf Class I and Class II milk. and fQQd-marketing CQst indices fQr labQr. packaging. transportatiQn. and tQtal marketing CQsts fQr the period January 1971-December 1981 were used.
2 AbQut Qne-third Qf the QbservatiQns in the sample were mQnths Qf farm price decline. This prQvided a sufficient number Qf price declines to' reliably assess the asymmetry issue by the statistical procedures used here. An example Qf the segmentatiQn procedure is presented in table I. NQte that it makes nO' difference whether the variable is lagged and then segmented Qr segmented and then lagged .
Significant serial cQrrelatiQn was evident in all the equatiQns estimated . T herefQre, Qnly generalized least 'squares estimates are presented. These estimates we{'e O'btained by using the first-Qrder autQregressive adjustment procedure available in the TROLL (MIn eCQnQmetric software program.
Lag structures Qf the equatiO'ns were estimated using the Almon prQcedu{'e. Lag structures were assumed to' lie Qn a IO'w-Qrder polynQmial. The additiQnal restrictiQn that the lag structure terminates in a zerO' coe· fficient was imposed Qn the icecream -equatiQn. The length of the lag distributiQn was determined by adding additiQnal lagged variables to' the model until a statistically insignificant effect was fQund.
Initially. equatiQn (2) was estimated with labQr. packaging materials. and the ·transpor-tatiQncQst variables specified separately. HQwever. the high cQllinearity among these variables ·gave f'esults that were incQnsistent with a priori expectatiQns. TherefOf'e. an index Qf tQtal fQod-marketing 'cQst was used in place Qf the cQmponent marketing cost variables. TheequatiQns were alsO' -estimated with vari-QUS subperiods Qf the data to' determine the structural stability Qf the coefficients. Results shQwed SQme tendency fQr the price transmissiQn 'coefficients -to' becQme larger in later sub-: The exception is icc cream. where the data period terminates in December 1980 rather than 1981. The retail price series for this commodity in 1981 was inconsistent with the earlier data. A more complete description of the data and sources is provided in a data appendix available upon r.:quest from the authors . Note :
FF, E cumulative sum of r,
periods, but differences were not large enough to be statistically significant. The hypothesis that regressiol) coefficients pertaining to the first half of the sample period are identical to those of the second half could not be rejected at even the 10% probability level for any of the dairy products studied. Therefore, onJy results pertaining to the overall period are presented.
Empirical Results
The generalized least squares est;mates of equation (2) (summarized in -table 2) indicate that the model provides a reasonably good specification of the price t'l"ansmission process for the dairy sector. R1.'s show that 55% to 95% of the variation in retail prices is "explained" by the lagged farm price variables, the trend term, and the {otal food-marketing cost variable with the butter equation having the lowest R2 and cheese the highest. Estimated coefficients, in general, are ·significant and agree with a priori expectations. Results discussed below will focus on the findings relating to the asymmetry question. The hypothesi·s of asymme~ry in the retail pricing of dai.y products requires that t-he empirical evidence show a significant difference in the sum of the coeffi"cients of the rising. vis-a-vis the falling, farm price variables as specified in equation (2) for all four dairy products studied. the cumulative effect on retail dairy prices of an increase in the farm price of milk exceeds the cumulative effect of a farm price decrease (table 2) . The I-test (discussed abvve) of the null hypothesis that retail prices respond symmetrically to increases and decreases in the farm prices is rejected at the 10% level or lower for all four products. Moreove r, the mean lags (Rao and Miller, associated with the rising farm price variables are unifonnly smaller than the corresponding mean lags of the failing farm price variables, indicating that retail dairy product prices adjust more slowly to decreases in the farm price of milk than to increases. This last result follows even though the lag lengths for falling and rising farm prices are identical for each dairy product (three months for fluid milk and butter, six months for cheese, and five months for ice cream).
Elasticities of price transmission, evaluated at mean data points, further illustrate the unequal retail response to changes in the farm price of milk (table 3) . The long-run risingprice elasticities exceed corresponding falling-price elasticities by 40% for fluid milk, 16% for cheese, 69% for butter, and 238% for ice cream.
3 Thus, increases in the farm price of milk are passed through to the retail level more fully than are farm price decreases. The slower retail response to decreases in the farm price of milk is illustrated by the small size of shor:t-run -elasticities relative to long-run elasticities.
An Alternative Explanation for Pricing Asymmetry
The discussion thus far has identified industry concentration and government pri' ce support activities as po' ssible explanations for the observed asymmetry in farm-retail price transmission in the dairy sector. An alternative explanation is suggested in the static marketing margin model set forth by Gardner (1975) . Gardner's model is developed under the <{win assumptions of long-run competitive equilib-J The rciatively small estimates of price transmi ssion elasticities for ice cream may reflect the marketing channel for ice cream. In particular. ice cream manufacturers tend not to purchase milk directly from farmers but mther to obtain icc ·cream mix·from fluid milk bottling plant s which produce it as a by-product in order to utilize excesS cream. Thus . ice cream manufacturers may observe the fann price only indirectly via the wholesale price of ice cream mix .. Hence. a weaker link between farm and retail prices is ex· pected. rium and constant returns to scale. In the model, the mathematical expre' ssion defining the farm-retail price transmission elasticity differs depending on whether observed changes in the marketing mar-gin Me cau'sed by retaiJ.-level demand shifts for food or farmlevel supply shif-ts for the agricultural product. In particular, if strictly cost-push elements are the case, the farm-retail -price transmission e1asticity is shown to -be smaHer in numerical value -than ifst-rict4y demand~pull forces are at work. The potential importance.for price transmission work of distinguishing-rctail -demand from farm supply shifrs is emphasizcd by somc numerical results deriv.cd from the Gardner model. We specified a range of relevant values for the parametcrs govcrningthc price transmissron mechanism in long-run competitive equilibrium as shown in footnote a of lable 4.
The results showed that a substantially larger price transmission elasticity is obtained when retail demand shifts are relevant vis-a-vis farm supply shifts (table 4). The greatest difference occurs when the farm based input is more elastic in supply than the marketing services input. In this case, the price transmission elasticity under demand shocks is 3.75 times larger than under supply shocks .4 Price transmission elasticity differences for other assumed parameter values are smaller but nonetheless substantiaI enough to further investigate this potential source of asymmetry.
The Gardner theory is relevant to this study because the markup pricing model represented by equation {I) is based on the assumption that only farm-level supply shifts are relevant; that is, farm prices ',-<;au' se" retail prices and not vice versa. The assumption of unidirectional causality from farm to retail appears plausible for <iairy products as a group . becausegove-rnment net pm'chases over -the sample period were at least I % of total production (Novakovic) , meaning that ,government was setting [arm -prices. However, the assumption is less plausible for individual datry products. For example, 'cheeSe consumption has increased steadily over time. If retail 'demand shifts {or cheese were dominating farm ' supplyshifts for milk d uring specific time intervals over the sample period, asymmetry in long-run farm-retail price transmission would be expected a priori. Examination of actual data on commercial disappearance suggests that retail demand shifts over the study period were important for butter and cheese but not for fluid milk or ice cream. However, inventories of butter and cheese were quite large in many years, especially since 1977 for butter and in 1980-81 for cheese. The existence of large inventories is expected to neutralize the effect of demand shifts because stocks and not prices would be affected. 'Thus, only those periods in which inventories were small need to be considered here in testing the asymmetry hypothesis.
To tes.t whether retail demand shifts playa role in explaining the observed pricing asymmetry in the dairy sector, the following equation was e'stimated:
where R, is the retail -price ofbu{<ter (cheese), P, is -the Class ilprice of mil' k expressed as a weighted moving average of current and past prices.
5 M, is afood-markeling cost index. and , The theory underlying equation (4) refers to long·run t",nsmi's, sion elasticities: therefore . to simplify tc:sting yet maintain -consis. tency with the theory. a weighted farm price variable was speci· fied. The formula for constructing F, is F, = ~f .. Ok·;P2,_j. where w':s are the weighclng factors. P2, -i is the ,Class 11 price df milk in month ' . and N is .he length (in months) of the weighting period.
Based on the regression 'r~suhs presented t:arlicr. N = 2 and ,V = 5 were assumed for buller and cheese, respectively. Specific weights usc:d wcr~ ""0 = .~I. "", = .33. and ""! = . 16 for butler and ""0 = . 03~, ""I = ")13. "'": = . .JJ~. "'" ,I = .21-' . ","" = .075. and ",.~ = ,O~ I for chee se .
D, is a dummy variable assigned a value of one for the period Jan . 1973-Dec. 1976 when butter price is the dependent variable (zero otherwise) and the value of one for J an. 1972-Dec. 1976 and Jan.-Dec. 1979 when cheese price is the dependent variable (zero otherwise). The dummy variable indicates periods of simultaneously tight inventories and significant retail demand shifts. Because the theory suggests a larger price transmission elasticity under retail demand shifts vis-a-vis farm supply shifts, a positive sign for ' Y is expected. Thus, a righttailt-t.est is used to implement the test.
Generalized least squares estimates of equation (4) show that ' Y is pbsitive as expected for both commodities but significant only for chee'se (table 5) . Moreover, the numerical value of'Y is small in each equation, suggesting an elasticity differential of 6% or less in periods of apparent significant retail demand shifts. These f'esults 'SuggeSt that -retail demand shocks play a relatively unimportant role in explaining t-he .farm-retail price transmission asymmetry observed in this study.
As a final comment on the Gardner model, note that the e' stimated long-run price transmission elasticities in ·table 3 are uniformly le'ss than one and are 'smaller or differ only slightly from respective farmers' share values. According -to USDA estimates (Jones, Dunham) , the farmers' share 'of the consumer dollar for each dairy product is mil-k, .54; cheese . . 4S; buHer, .66; and ice cream, .34 . From the Gardner model, if(a) only farm supply shifts are operant. (b) Ihe marketing "pro- duction" process is characterized by fixed proportions, and (c) the retail demand elasticity is arithmetically less than the marketing services supply elasticity, the farmers' share sets an upper bound on the (long-run) elasticity of price transmission. If marketing services are petfectly elastic in supply, farmers' share and the pri'Ce transmission elasticity are identical (assuming only farm supply shocks are rclevant). The -consistency of the empirical results with theory supports the basic assumption unde-rlying the markup model that the direction of causation in price transmission is from farm to -retail. This consistency increases confidence in the accuracy of the estimated price transmission elasticities.
-Concluding Comments -Empirical results'suggest that the farm-retail price transmission process in the dairy sector is characterized -by asymmetry. Price {mns-mission elasticities for rising farm prices were i<i% -to 238% larger than corresponding eta'Stici{ies associated with falling farm prices eepending on the dairy product. Moreover, although lag1engths were identical for rising and falfing farm prices. mean lags ·corresponding to rising farm ·prices were much smaller than forialling farm prices. Thus. the major impact on retail-prices of a change in ·the farm price of milk is felt 'sooner when {ann prices are inorea'sing than when 'farm ·prices are deaeasing. The slower response of retail prices to downward movements in farm prices helps expiain the commonly held belief that consumers do not obenefit from decrea' ses in -farm prices. Still, however. {he decreases in the farm price of miH< are eventually passed a!ong .to consumers.
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